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Financing Pharmaceutical Innovation: How Much
Should Poor Countries Contribute?
William Jack and Jean O. Lanjouw
A public economics framework is used to consider how pharmaceuticals should be
priced when at least some of the research and development incentive comes from sales
revenues. Familiar techniques of public finance are used to relax some of the restric-
tions implied in the standard use of Ramsey pricing. Under the more general model,
poor countries should not necessarily cover even their own marginal costs, and the
pricing structure is not related to that which would be chosen by a monopolist in a
simple way. This framework is then used to examine ongoing debates regarding the
international patent system as embodied in the World Trade Organization’s Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.
The most contentious issue in the pharmaceutical sector is not whether or how
much to support private research. Most observers recognize the major contribu-
tions to global health that have come from private research efforts and the fact
that price-cost margins supported by the patent system have been pivotal in
stimulating that research. Conflicts arise instead over how the financing of
research and development (R&D) incentives should be shared among consu-
mers. How much of the total cost should a U.S. retiree, a French worker, or an
Ethiopian peasant be expected to contribute?
Today the tensions are clearly on display. Senior citizen outrage over high
drug costs in the United States has driven legislation through Congress to create
a massive Medicare prescription drug benefit that will shift costs from pharma-
ceutical consumers to taxpayers at large. Similar outrage has led to repeated
efforts to legalize the importation of lower priced Canadian drugs into the
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45United States. The goal: to shift some of the costs of pharmaceutical research
from Americans to Canadians. In a similar vein, an increasing number of voices
support the view expressed by Mark McClellen, then commissioner of the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration, in Cancu ´n that
the main reason [U.S.] prices are higher is that our country is paying the bulk of the costs of
developing new treatments. That’s got many Americans angry.... I know that many are compla-
cent with the current situation, in which the United States has borne the bulk of costs. I know it is
not clear how to work together internationally to create better ways to share the burden than are
provided by our current trade agreements. But it is clear to me that we cannot carry the lion’s
share of this burden for much longer.
1
The goal is, at least implicitly, to shift more of the costs of pharmaceutical
research to Europeans and others.
These conflicts within and between rich countries reflect the same debate that
has been raging for years over drug pricing in the developing world. The heart of
the controversy is distributional: Given a desire to support private research, to
what extent should industry control of sales in poor countries be part of the
effort? The developing economy debate has focused mainly on the minimum
standards for patent protection set forth for members of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS),
2 in particular the requirement that member countries
offer protection for pharmaceutical innovations.
The institutional apparatus embodied by TRIPS is a significant factor in
determining the prices at which pharmaceutical products (or licenses to produce
them) are sold in different countries. More generally, these prices and license
payments are the result of negotiations between governments and firms, within
a legal and regulatory framework that seeks to both stimulate appropriate levels
of R&D and promote broad access to available drugs. The public debate over
the suitability of the international pharmaceutical prices that emerge from this
process tends to be polarized between those who focus on the incentive effects
and those who concentrate on other social objectives. The purpose of this article
is to provide a framework for determining a policy that respects both objectives.
To this end, most of the legal aspects of the debate are abstracted and well-
established techniques of applied public finance are employed to integrate both
efficiency and distributional concerns.
Although the analysis here accounts for the need to provide incentives to
develop new products, it does not formally address the question of how much
incentive should be provided. Furthermore, a variety of policy options can be
used to support research and address distributional concerns. The broad com-
position of these policies is taken as given, and the focus is on how to best
1. See www.fda.gov/oc/speeches/2003/genericdrug0925.html (accessed April 20, 2005).
2. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C. Available online at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
trips_e/trips_e.htm (accessed April 20, 2005).
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generating any given profit from sales should be shared across countries. The
basic principles of optimal pricing presented here are consistent with broadly
defined social objectives. These principles have come to be known as Ramsey
pricing, after the seminal work of Frank Ramsey (1927).
3
The techniques reviewed in this article are not new. Indeed, some of the
literature on pharmaceutical pricing has employed them already (see Danzon
1997, 2001). In most of this literature, however, the assumptions that underlie
the derivation of standard Ramsey prices are very restrictive. In particular, they
require either that concerns about the global distribution of well-being be suitably
addressed through other policies or that policymakers have no such concerns.
The characterization here of social objectives—which is general enough to
encompass a broad range of distributional preferences—will be familiar to
students and practitioners of applied public economics, although it does not
appear to have been explicitly employed in formal analyses of international
pharmaceutical pricing. Once one departs from the restrictive assumptions
imposed by the standard (distributionally neutral) Ramsey pricing model, the
pricing rules are replaced by so-called many-person Ramsey rules (Diamond
1975). Ramsey prices calculated in the standard way are a special case.
The analysis here highlights two common prescriptions derived from the
standard Ramsey pricing model that are not valid once one allows for more
broadly defined social objectives. First is that prices should at least cover marginal
costs in each country—that is, countries should pay at least for the direct costs of
delivering drugs—a conclusion valid only when distributional concerns are not
incorporated into the analysis. Second is that pricing structures should be closely
related to those that would arise under monopoly pricing in each country. Again,
this does not carry over to optimal policies in the presence of distributionally
sensitive objectives. In addition, using a natural formulation of health needs, the
standard model prescribes higher prices in countries with greater need for drugs.
Rationalizing such a policy when equity is a concern would be difficult.
Section I discusses how the problem examined in this article fits into the more
general problem of the provision of incentives for R&D. Section II presents the
intuition for and derivation of the many-person Ramsey rule and relates it
directly to the determination of reasonable royalty rates on compulsory licenses.
In the light of this analysis, section III reviews the more standard Ramsey pricing
rule and illustrates how policy implications drawn from the standard model can
differ from those derived from the more general framework. Section IV illus-
trates the tradeoffs between pricing, welfare, and R&D investment and explores
several recent controversies.
3. This work enjoyed a renaissance in the early 1970s with the work of Baumol and Bradford (1970)
and Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). The same tools have been extensively applied to the question of
public enterprise pricing, as exposited by Bo ¨s (1986), for example.
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The formulation of public policy regarding pharmaceutical pricing can be use-
fully thought of as proceeding in three steps: establishing the total amount of
resources that society should devote to research, identifying the broad mechan-
isms by which such funds are raised and allocated, and designing each broad
mechanism. Although the focus of this article is the third step, for clarity each
part of the process is briefly discussed.
How Big an Incentive to Provide for Innovation
It is widely believed that under a laissez-faire policy, incentives for investment
in R&D are severely attenuated and the aggregate amount of R&D investment
is far less than what would be socially desirable. This is because the produc-
tion of new drugs (like many other innovations) exhibits significant returns to
scale due to the presence of sometimes enormous fixed costs, and competition
leading to marginal cost pricing results in negative profits. Exactly what level
of R&D is optimal depends on several factors. In general, the right level of
R&D depends on its expected benefits and costs in the obvious way. The
extent to which research investment leads to the discovery of new products,
coupled with an evaluation of the benefits of these new products, must be
weighed against the value of other goods that could otherwise have been
obtained. Making these tradeoffs requires careful attention to such factors as
the rate of time preference (because research pays off in the longer run) and the
cost of stimulating different levels of innovation. These topics are not pursued
further in this article.
4
How to Support Innovation
A variety of mechanisms exist for providing R&D incentives in the presence of
increasing returns to scale. The patent system promises future profits on sales.
Various tax credits and subsidies (such as the orphan drug legislation in the
United States) provide returns not so much for successful innovation but for
attempts at innovation (that is, at the research stage). Alternatively, some R&D
is funded directly by the government through public institutions (such as the
U.S. National Institutes of Health). The relevant distinction here is between
research support derived from profits on sales of successful innovations and
research support provided through the general tax system.
Suppose that total R&D funding is the sum of R, funding from sales revenues
in excess of marginal costs, and T, funding from general taxes. An important
finding of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) is that under certain conditions, if a
government wants to raise a certain amount of revenue with both efficiency and
4. See Nordhaus (1969) and Scherer (1972, 2003) for discussion of some of the tradeoffs involved in
this decision.
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and avoid taxing the consumption of goods and services separately.
5 In the
context of pharmaceutical pricing, this would mean that drug prices should
be set equal to marginal cost (that is, very close to zero) and that R would be
zero.
However, in practice there are many sound reasons why sales revenues in
excess of marginal costs might be a useful source of financing. First, the form of
research support can affect the productivity of the investment. In particular,
support from sales of products gives researchers a larger incentive to find
products that address consumer needs than to, say, work on projects that
are primarily of scientific interest. It might be politically easier for governments
to allow a firm to charge certain prices than to hand over a large sum of
tax revenue. Governments can thus maintain support for the overall R&D
incentive if at least some of the funding does not come from explicit tax
increases.
6
More important, even if all other conditions are satisfied, the Atkinson-
Stiglitz result requires a sophisticated (nonlinear) worldwide income tax.
Clearly, the global institutions are not in place to implement such a tax, with
good reasons, including institutional and political constraints and corruption.
When equity concerns cannot be directly addressed, it is important to take into
account the distributional implications of all policies. Drug pricing may well be
one of the more effective tools for redistribution because it targets a basic
human need and provides resources in a form more difficult to divert than,
say, direct transfers to country governments.
Pricing to Yield R
Having established the size of the research support that society is willing to
provide and the division of this incentive between taxes, T, and net sales
revenues, R, the last issue to address is the design of the price structure that
will yield R, the primary subject of this article. The results will apply to any level
of R: As the choices made in the first two steps change, the pricing formulas
remain unaffected (although the actual prices prescribed will change). That is,
the general insights into the structure of prices conditional on R remain infor-
mative as R changes.
The design of the price structure, and possible practical limitations on it,
will inform and feed back into the decisions made in the first two steps. For
example, if certain constraints mean that feasible prices differ from prices
that would otherwise be considered optimal, then policymakers might want
5. This result is in the context of a static model with no savings. Under an intertemporal model with
savings the result indicates the optimality of a (nonlinear) consumption tax. See Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1980).
6. Of course, this is not to suggest that prices above marginal cost are not taxes, rather that they are
perceived differently by voters.
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distributional goals. Furthermore, the total resources that should be devoted
to research may be revised if otherwise desirable pricing policies are
unavailable.
With this in mind, readers should interpret the findings here as the first input
(working backward) in the solution to the three-part problem of finding ways to
induce R&D when policymakers care about dynamic efficiency (that is, R&D
incentives), static efficiency (such as the distortionary costs of monopoly pri-
cing), and equity.
II. RAMSEY PRICING
The analysis here starts by considering the simplest model with two countries,
north and south.
7 It also assumes that both countries have the same number of
residents and that they are identical within each country.
8 Thus for simplicity
each country, i=n, s, is assumed to have a single consumer
9 with income, mi,
10
who chooses between two goods, x, which represents all other goods and
whose price is normalized to 1, and a drug, y, available in country i at a
price, pi. Incomes can vary across countries. The consumption preferences of
the consumer in country i are represented by a function, ui(x, y). The con-
sumers in both countries are assumed to have the same preferences for the two
goods. However, in the next section preferences for drugs will be allowed to
differ in north and south, due, say, to differences in disease conditions and
health needs.
These preferences can be used to determine the highest level of utility that the
consumer can attain with income mi and drug price pi. Because there is no
saving in this simple model, consumers will spend their entire incomes so that
x+piy=mi. Then consumer i’s maximum utility level (indirect utility function)
for any price and income can be written
viðpi;miÞ¼ max
x;y
uiðx; yÞ
subject to x þ piy ¼ mi:
ð1Þ
7. The analysis would hold for any number of countries.
8. The assumption that individuals in a given country are identical is clearly contrary to fact and
made to highlight the ways pharmaceutical prices should vary across countries. In addition, differential
drug pricing within a country is likely to be more difficult to implement than differential pricing across
countries, and other means of redistribution are likely to exist within countries that are not available for
redistribution across countries.
9. The optimal pricing rules are the same for any distribution of population across countries,
although the level of prices would differ.
10. mi is income net of any contributions, ti, to tax-financed R&D incentives, T. Taking the ti as
given, only the distribution of mi across countries matters, not the distribution of ti. Since the ti are small
relative to the mi, this distinction is of little practical importance.
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some concept of global aggregate well-being as large as possible.
11 Extending in
a natural way a long tradition of applied public economics for determining
country-level tax policies, this goal is described in terms of global social welfare,
which depends on the utility of consumers in both countries. That is, social
welfare is a function, W(vn, vs).
12 How much a small increase in the utility of
consumer i contributes to social welfare depends on how W is defined and on
consumer i’s starting level of utility, as well as the utility levels of other
consumers. The incremental effect of an increase in consumer i’s utility is
denoted by gi=@W/@vi.
To determine appropriate prices across countries, it is useful to observe that
the way in which a price increase in country i affects social welfare can be
decomposed into two parts. First, increasing the drug price will generally lower
consumer i’s utility (assuming the drug was already being consumed). If con-
sumer i’s drug consumption was yi initially and remained at that level after a
small increase in the drug price, Dpi, the effect of the price increase would be the
same as if consumer i’s income had been reduced by Dmi=Dpi yi. Thus,
knowing what effect a reduction in income would have on consumer utility
allows an assessment of the first impact of a price increase in country i.
This marginal utility of income is typically denoted by ai=@vi/@mi. Studies of
behavior under conditions of uncertainty indicate that ai is very likely to decline
as income increases. That is, people get less benefit from an extra dollar as they
become richer.
13
Second, as discussed earlier, the reduction in consumer utility in country i
(Dvi) will have an effect on social welfare. The two pieces together give the total
effect on social welfare of a change of income in country i. This is denoted bi:
 i ¼ð @W=@viÞð@vi=@miÞ
¼  i i:
ð2Þ
With the relationship between price and income changes, Dmi=Dpi yi, changing
the drug price in country i would have the following effect on social welfare:
11. Exactly who determines priorities at the global level is not addressed here. The purpose is simply
to ask how prices should be chosen, given some criterion that is global in nature because it incorporates
the well-being of consumers in different countries.
12. This article assumes that competition drives rents in the pharmaceutical industry to zero, so that
all net revenue is invested in R&D. More generally, if pharmaceutical companies earn positive rents (that
is, profits in excess of the cost of capital), static social welfare can be defined as a function of consumer
utilities and profits, where the weight on profits depends on how they are distributed. Allowing for
positive profits would affect the choice of the optimal level of R&D incentive, but not the pricing rules
conditional on R focused on here.
13. The value of a indicates how a given consumer would view an extra dollar if the consumer were
poor compared with if the same individual were rich. A declining a does not necessarily imply that an
extra dollar would give every rich consumer less utility than it would give to a poor consumer—only if
they derive the same utility from consumption, as assumed in this section.
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¼   iyi:
ð3Þ
Thus lowering the price of the drug in country i tends to be most beneficial
when bi is large. The value of bi is large when extra income is particularly
valuable to the consumer in country i (large ai) and when boosting the well-
being of those in country i is viewed as particularly important (large gi). For
example, if extra income is more valuable to poor consumers and if south is the
poorer country, as>an. Second, a preference for a more equal distribution of
well-being implies that gs>gn.
14 Thus on both accounts one might expect
bs>bn. One objective of this article is to bring attention to the fact that the
use of public economics in the policy debate on international drug pricing has
implicitly assumed a very special (and arguably unrepresentative) case: one in
which both ai and gi, and hence bi, are constant across all countries at all
incomes.
Derivation of Ramsey Prices
The model described earlier is used to characterize the optimal drug price in
each country. It is assumed that the marginal cost of producing and distributing
the drug is constant within a country but can vary across countries and is equal
to ci in country i.
15 Now, suppose that for a given product the innovator firm is
permitted to generate sales revenue over costs of R. The optimal set of drug
prices pn and ps are those that give the highest social welfare, W, subject to this
revenue constraint. It is assumed that profits (or losses) on sales accrue to the
firm, either because the firm sells the drug directly or because it controls and sets
the terms of licenses to alternative manufactures. If licensing is compulsory,
there must be enough competition among generics manufacturers that they do
not profit from sales. It also means that there are no import or sales taxes.
Formally, these prices solve the problem
(4) max
pn;ps
Wðvn;vsÞ
subject to  
i
ðpi   ciÞyi ¼ R:
A Lagrange multiplier, l, is introduced on the constraint, so that the first-order
conditions satisfied at the optimal prices are
14. The welfare function is usually assumed to be anonymous, that is, it does not discriminate
directly among consumers. But, for example, if one cared less about the well-being of consumers from
the south, then all else equal, gs would tend to be lower than gn. A strong enough preference for
northerners could imply a desire to redistribute from the poorer south to the richer north.
15. The marginal cost of delivery could vary within a country. This is ignored here, and it is assumed
that the costs of launching a product in an additional country (obtaining marketing approval, advertising
to doctors, arranging distribution, and the like) are negligible.
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The (negative of the) first term is the marginal social cost (that is, the incremental
reduction in social welfare) associated with a price increase in country i, MSCi.
The bracketed part of the second term is the marginal revenue earned from a price
increase in country i, MRi. The condition then says that for each country
MSCi=MRi ¼  : ð6Þ
The ratio on the left side is the reduction in welfare as revenue generated by
sales in country i increases. Because l is the same for both countries, the
marginal social cost of revenue generation is equalized across countries. That
is, at the optimum prices, raising an extra dollar from either country should
have the same (negative) effect on social welfare: if the marginal welfare loss per
unit of net revenue differed between countries, the amount earned from each
could be adjusted, keeping aggregate net revenue constant at R, while reducing
the total social cost.
Using equation 3, equation 5 can be rearranged as
p 
i   ci

=p 
i ¼½ ð      iÞ=   1= i; ð7Þ
where p 
i is the optimal (Ramsey) price in country i and Zi= (pi/yi)( @yi/@pi)>0
is the elasticity of demand for the drug in that country.
16 It measures how
sensitively consumers react by adjusting their consumption of drugs when prices
change. The Lagrange multiplier, l, measures the social value of relaxing the
financing constraint by a dollar—that is, the gain in social welfare that would
accrue if the revenue allowed the firm, R, was marginally reduced. As discussed
earlier, bi, measures the increase in social welfare associated with a $1 increase
in the income of the consumer in country i.
For a given elasticity of demand, the markup as a share of the final price is
smaller the larger bi is. As argued, bi might be expected to be larger in a poor
country, which would suggest lower markups. In general, though, there is no
reason to expect that at the optimum prices, bi<l for all countries i (although it
must be the case that bi<l for at least one country for revenue to be nonnega-
tive). That is, the term in brackets could even be negative. This means that
Ramsey prices do not necessarily cover marginal costs in all countries, because if
16. It is assumed that optimal prices, including Ramsey and monopoly prices, are unique. Equation 7
is closely related to Diamond’s (1975) many-person Ramsey rule. Despite the mathematical similarity,
however, there is a slight difference in interpretation. Diamond’s analysis considers the optimal tax rates
applied to several different goods, under the constraint that these tax rates must be the same for all
individuals. Under the model here there is just one taxed good, the drug, but it is assumed to be possible
to apply different tax rates (prices different to marginal cost) to it in different countries, that is, tax rates
that depend on who buys the drug.
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i < ci. This possibility is illustrated
graphically in the appendix. (Whether such prices can be attained given avail-
able policy tools is considered in section IV.)
Finally, note that the condition refers to the markup over cost as a share of
price. If the marginal cost of producing and distributing the drug, ci, is the same
across countries, a lower markup in country i also implies a lower price in
country i. If it is not the same, the final price, pi, could be higher in the country
with the lower markup.
Ramsey-Reasonable Royalty Rates
The TRIPS agreement allows for the compulsory licensing of patented innovations
in some circumstances. These licenses give manufacturers the right to produce
and sell a patented product in the country issuing the license in return for
adequate remuneration to the patent holder (TRIPS, articles 31h and 31k). In
general, when compensation is due a patentee, it is commonly in the form of
royalty payments per unit of sales, and laws requiring compensation are some-
times directly specified in relation to reasonable royalties.
17 What is ‘‘reason-
able’’ is not clearly stated and is open to interpretation.
18 One natural approach
to this problem in the international context is to follow the same line of reason-
ing used here, asking what royalty rates would generate the highest level of
social welfare.
Royalty payments are typically defined as a share of the final sale price. Thus,
if the royalty rate to be paid to the inventor on sales in country i is, say, ri, the
marginal cost of production to the manufacturing firm becomes ci+ripi. If the
market is competitive—that is, with several generics producers operating under
compulsory license—the price will equal the marginal cost of production,
pi=ci+ripi. In this case
ri ¼ð pi   ciÞ=pi ð8Þ
and the royalty rate in country i will determine the markup as a share of price in
that country.
19 Thus, given competition, it follows directly that the Ramsey-
reasonable royalty rate is defined by equation 7.
III. STANDARD RAMSEY PRICES
This section presents the special case of the model illustrated earlier that has
been used in the discussion of international drug prices. Two common prescrip-
17. In assessing damages in infringement cases, for example, 35 U.S.C. §284 provides that damages
should be ‘‘in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention.’’
18. See Scherer and Watal (2002) for an interesting discussion of historical practice within countries.
19. Without competition and price controls the price would be higher. Some of the resulting revenue
would go to the inventor as royalty payments and some would go to the generics producer as profit.
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odds with those drawn from the more general formulation discussed earlier. The
first is that prices should at least cover marginal costs in each country. The
second is that the pricing structure should be closely related to what would arise
if monopoly prices were charged in each country. The special model also
suggests that prices should be higher in countries with a greater need for
drugs. This inference is not typically noted.
Consumer Surplus, Ramsey Prices, and ‘‘Fair’’ Prices
The standard approach does not incorporate any concern for the distributional
effect of drug prices. There are two interpretations of this treatment. First, it
could mean that distribution simply does not matter. This requires assuming
that an extra dollar gives the same amount of additional utility to a consumer
regardless of that person’s starting income level. That is, the marginal utility of
income, ai, is constant. Furthermore, it requires that the way any total amount
of utility is distributed between the two consumers is not given any particular
importance. Formally, a social welfare function is implicitly assumed, and it is
utilitarian:
Wðvn;vsÞ¼vn þ vs: ð9Þ
With the utilitarian social welfare function, gs=gn=1. Together with the con-
stant marginal utility of income, this means that bi=b is also constant.
The second interpretation is that distribution does matter, but that it is
expected to be dealt with in other ways. If there are other (unused but never-
theless effective) avenues for bringing all consumers in the world to a similar
level of well-being, distributional concerns can be safely ignored when pricing
drugs. In either interpretation, bi can be treated as constant across countries,
and the optimal pricing conditions from equation 7 simplify to
ð  pi   ciÞ=  pi ¼½ ð      Þ=   1= i; ð10Þ
where p ¯i is the optimal price and b=ag=a.
20
The term in brackets, (l b)/l, is now constant across countries. Thus prices
should differ across countries in such a way that the proportional markup as a
share of price is inversely related to the elasticity of demand at those prices—the
standard result. This rule implies higher prices for those who change their con-
sumption less, and it is efficient because it causes the least distortion to consump-
tion patterns. Finally, it can be argued in this special case that at the optimal prices,
20. It is common in the literature on regulation and utility pricing, and in some accounts of
international drug pricing, to adopt the maximization of a measure of aggregate consumer surplus as
the policy objective. This approach can be reconciled with the one adopted here, with ai=a for i=n and s,
and a utilitarian social welfare function.
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production and distribution there. This is shown graphically in the appendix.
It is tempting to interpret the condition that each country cover at least its
own marginal costs as fair. But this can be fair only in a procedural sense.
Putting such a condition on prices only emerges as a general policy prescription
when concern for equity is ruled out.
Comparison with Monopoly Pricing
If a single firm were producing and selling the drug, and if the firm could freely
choose prices in separate country markets, it would set prices to maximize net
revenue, R=Si(pi ci)yi. The first order condition for this problem is simply
yi þð pi   ciÞð@yi=@piÞ¼0; ð11Þ
which is the same as equation 5, except that it does not have a term giving
weight to social welfare. The monopolist would thus choose prices pm
i in
different countries to satisfy
pm
i   ci

=pm
i ¼ 1= i: ð12Þ
When compared with equation 10, the relative price-cost markups derived in
the special case are proportional to what would be chosen by a price-discrimi-
nating monopolist. That is, if  i=(pi ci)/pi is the markup as a share of price in
country i,
 m
s = m
n ¼  n= s ¼    s=   n: ð13Þ
These can be compared with the ratio of price-cost markups under the optimal
Ramsey prices characterized in equation 7:
  
s=  
n ¼½ ð      sÞ=ð     nÞ   m
s = m
n : ð14Þ
If bs>bn, the relative markup in country s is smaller than the relative markup
that would be chosen by a price-discriminating monopolist.
Factors Determining the Elasticity of Demand
The standard Ramsey and monopoly pricing rules, equations 10 and 12, have
been loosely interpreted as requiring prices to be higher in countries with
lower demand elasticities, because the elasticity of demand is typically not
constant as a function of price. Indeed, when marginal costs are zero, these
rules collapse to Zi=(l b)/l or Zi=1, that is, prices should be set so that the
elasticity of demand is equal across countries. In general, this requires differ-
ential prices if the relationship between price and elasticity differs by country.
This begs the question of how demand elasticities are likely to vary across
countries. This section offers two illustrative answers to this question. Two
important dimensions along which countries differ are income and health
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poorer and sicker than consumers in countries in the north.
THE EFFECT OF INCOME ON DEMAND ELASTICITY. Suppose consumer demand for a
drug in country i is a linear function of its price and the consumer’s income,
yðpi;miÞ¼ y0   bðpi=miÞ if pi < y0m=u;
0 otherwise

ð15Þ
where y0 is the same for both countries and measures the amount of the drug
that would be consumed if it were free and b is a constant. Note that for any
price at which demand is positive, demand is increasing in income and decreas-
ing in price. But there is no difference between the countries in terms of their
health needs, that is, if consumers in the two countries had the same income and
faced the same prices, their demand for the drug would be the same.
It is easy to show that the elasticity of demand in country i is
 i ¼ð y0   yÞ=y: ð16Þ
This elasticity is decreasing in income and increasing in price. These two proper-
ties together imply that prices should be higher in the north than in the south,
even with distributionally insensitive social objectives. If equity is a concern, the
optimal price differential between north and south will increase further.
THE EFFECT OF HEALTH NEEDS ON DEMANDELASTICITY. Disease prevalence and the
susceptibility of people to disease differ markedly across countries, so some
pharmaceutical products will be in higher demand in some countries than in
others. Demand for pharmaceuticals may also be higher in some countries
because alternative medical treatments are unavailable or more costly. Perhaps
the easiest way to incorporate these country differences into the Ramsey pricing
analysis is to suppose that the utility that consumers in country i obtain from the
consumption of a drug, y, and other products, x, can be written
uiðx;yÞ¼ ½x þ uð iyÞ ; ð17Þ
where yi measures the value of the drug relative to other consumption in country
i.
21 Assuming a constant elasticity functional form for function v, demand
elasticities in this case are
21. This specification can be interpreted as follows: Consumers care about the composite good, x,
and their level of health attainment, h, according to u(x, h)=x+v(h). In practice, health attainment is a
complicated and not well-understood function of many variables, but here suppose it is a simple linear
function of the consumer’s consumption of the drug, h=yy, so that utility is u(x, y)=x+v(yy). A simple
way to model heterogeneous health needs is to assume that consumers with greater health needs have a
higher value of y, so that the effect of the drug on their health attainment is larger.
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Countries with greater need for drugs (higher yi) have lower demand elastici-
ties.
22
The Ramsey pricing rule, equation 7, now becomes
ðpi   ciÞ=pi ¼  ½ð     iÞ=   i: ð19Þ
This means that the markup is greater, the greater are health needs (as measured
by yi) and the smaller is bi. In the special case of a utilitarian social welfare
function and constant marginal utility of income ( 0 =1), so that bi=b for all i,
only the first effect is relevant, and equation 19 prescribes that countries
with greater needs should face higher prices. This result again highlights the
inadequacy of distributionally insensitive pricing rules, because it is likely that
countries with greater need for pharmaceuticals will also be relatively poorer.
IV. POLICY ILLUSTRATIONS
The Ramsey prices described earlier give the highest level of social welfare while
allowing an innovative firm to earn a given net revenue. How do these prices
compare with the prices expected under various regulatory and patent regimes?
This section uses a graphical tool to conveniently compare alternative policy
choices with each other and with the benchmark Ramsey prices. The model now
allows for many countries.
In many cases a given net revenue target, R, can be reached with a variety of
international price structures. Some might result in much of the revenue being
raised in richer countries, while others might have it raised in poorer countries.
With each set of prices an associated level of global welfare, W, is attained. The
shaded area in figure 1 depicts all the combinations of net revenue and welfare
(R, W) that can be obtained with different sets of global drug prices.
At point A, the sales revenue raised by the firm in excess of marginal costs,
Rm, is the amount that would be raised by a profit-maximizing monopolist able
to separate markets. This maximum net revenue target can be reached only if
the price in each country is the monopoly price for that country, pm
i . When
monopoly prices are charged in each country, social welfare is Wm.
At the other extreme, the firm receives no revenue in excess of marginal costs
and R=0. There is a set of Ramsey prices associated with this revenue target,
and these prices yield the highest level of social welfare, shown as point B.T o
22. Given the utility function in (17), at any price pi, consumers in country i have a demand for drugs
yi(pi ; yi) that satisfies the condition yiv0(yiyi)=pi. This condition implies that demand for the drug
depends on its price and consumer needs, yi, but not on income (admittedly an extreme assumption).
The elasticity of demand is then Zi (yi ; yi)= (1/yi)[ v0(yiyi)/yiv00(yiyi)]. In the special case where
v(h)=(h
1 r)/(1 r), for r E ( 1,1) then  yv
00/v0 =r and equation 18 follows.
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Thus the highest attainable welfare falls until point A is reached, with welfare
Wm. These maximum welfare levels, reached when Ramsey pricing is used to
generate any given net revenue target, are depicted by the bold line.
23
There is also a minimum level of welfare than can be reached for a given
revenue target. These ‘‘worst possible’’ welfare and revenue combinations form
the bottom edge of the shaded area in figure 1. For any given R there are prices
that can generate any intermediate levels of welfare between these bounds
(assuming continuity). Thus all combinations of R and W in the shaded area
can be attained by setting different drug prices.
Finally, point C has two interpretations. If the drug is developed, point C is
where the drug is priced so high everywhere that demand is zero and conse-
quently welfare is very low. Point C also represents the sales revenue (zero) and
welfare that would be obtained if the drug fails to be developed.
Limitations on Implementable Prices: Voluntary Participation
In the discussion of Ramsey pricing thus far it has been assumed that any price
could be set in any country. However, policymakers often control prices only
indirectly, and their options may be limited by the available policy tools and the
ways prices in one country affect prices elsewhere. This section considers what
prices could be implemented in practice.
R
W
Rm
A
B
Wm
0
C
FIGURE 1. Revenue-Welfare Options
Note: All points in the shaded region, representing revenue-welfare pairs (R, W), are attainable.
Those on the upper boundary are attained by setting Ramsey prices.
23. If no value is put on the well-being of some countries, their prices can be raised first without
affecting the level of social welfare and the bold line would be horizonal at low R.
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reached in each country by granting firms strong and well-enforced patent
rights—in particular, rights that are not compromised by compulsory licensing.
Prices below the monopoly level can be reached by granting firms patent rights
and then regulating price levels. Most developed economies follow this strategy,
and price controls come in a wide variety of forms.
Arriving at price equal to marginal cost can in principle be managed in two ways.
First, the price can be directly set at that level through regulation. This, however,
assumes that regulators have enough information to determine marginal cost, which
isunlikely,andthatfirmswouldnotrespondbyrefusingtoenterthemarket.Second,
the price canbe controlledindirectlyby allowingentry bycompetitive genericsfirms.
Givencurrent TRIPSobligations,thiscouldbeensuredonlythroughgovernmentgrant
of nonexclusive compulsory licenses. Of course, generics firms would need to
enter the market for competition to be effective, which cannot be assumed.
24
In many countries, other features of the market or regulation unrelated to patents
may limit competitive entry.
What about prices below marginal cost? As seen earlier, Ramsey prices may
be less than marginal cost in some countries. Firms may be willing to sell at a
loss in limited circumstances. Drug donation programs are an example,
although they do not fit the model here precisely because some part of the
cost to the firm is offset by tax deductions. One way to implement such prices is
to link sales across countries through a bulk purchase arrangement, in the spirit
of the large-scale procurement of vaccine by the United Nations Children’s
Fund. Firms would bid to sell a given quantity of a pharmaceutical at a
given uniform unit price to the intermediary, which would then sell the
product to individual countries at differentiated Ramsey prices.
25 Such sys-
tems, however, require an administrative infrastructure that would be costly to
expand to a broad range of pharmaceuticals. Furthermore, richer countries in
the arrangement effectively subsidize losses in the poorer ones, creating a clear
incentive for firms and richer countries to interact outside of the scheme.
26
Even if these difficulties could be overcome, it would be hard for governments
to credibly commit now to providing these sales arrangements for future new
drugs and therefore difficult to use them to encourage the right level of
investment today.
24. In August 2003 an agreement was reached on rules governing the export of drugs under
compulsory license to supply countries lacking the ability to manufacture their own (resolving the
‘‘paragraph 6’’ debate). How this agreement is implemented will influence the sources of generic supply
for poorer countries and thus competition among suppliers.
25. The United Nations Children’s Fund purchases vaccines primarily for distribution in developing
areas, so the potential cross-subsidy from richer countries is limited.
26. The obligation sometimes imposed on providers, such as the postal service, to serve unprofitable
locations or consumers at subsidized prices to obtain a larger contract is an example of such an
arrangement. The implicit subsidy from one group of consumers to another sometimes induces the
former to opt out and purchase services from alternative suppliers, such as private postal services.
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than marginal costs. Figure 2 shows what this limitation on pricing implies
for the options. At point A the Ramsey price in each country is the
monopoly price, which is greater than marginal cost, so this point remains
feasible.
When the net revenue target is zero, for all countries welfare-maximizing
prices equal marginal cost only when bi=b (see section III and the appendix).
On the other hand, if there is a concern for distribution, Ramsey prices may be
higher than marginal cost in some countries and lower in others. If so, restrict-
ing prices to be at least as high as marginal cost in all countries would lower
welfare in comparison with the welfare attained with Ramsey prices, and point
B would no longer be feasible. Figure 2 depicts the top portion of figure 1. The
upper boundary of the feasible area in figure 2 now starts at point B0 and
indicates the highest level of welfare possible with each revenue target when
all countries must cover their marginal costs. It is below the previous boundary,
implying less attractive options, until the point where the required net revenue is
sufficiently high that Ramsey prices also imply pi ci in all countries.
Limitations on Price Differentiation: Arbitrage and Reference Pricing
A second and far more restrictive limitation on pricing is a global uniformity
constraint. Completely uniform prices are unlikely, but there are two reasons
why it might be difficult for a firm to charge markedly different prices for the
same drug in different countries.
The first is arbitrage. The Washington Post described how $18 million worth
of reduced-price antiretroviral drugs meant for Africa were diverted back to the
R
W
Rm
A
B
Wm
0
B’
Uniform
prices
Unconstrained
prices
Prices at least
marginal cost
FIGURE 2. Revenue-Welfare Options with Constraints
Note: Limitations on prices shrink the feasible set of (R, W) pairs. At R=0, the highest
attainable welfare is at B0, below B. Along the bold line, price must be at least as high as marginal
cost, and along the dashed line, prices must be uniform across countries.
Jack and Lanjouw 61European market by black marketeers (October 3, 2002). Competition among
intermediaries tends to narrow the differences in prices across countries. With-
out competition between intermediaries, prices may stay high in the high-priced
countries with some part of the profit going to the intermediary. Either way
revenue to the innovative firm falls.
27
The second factor pushing global prices together is regulatory practice. In
particular, many countries’ price control boards refer to prices in other countries
when determining their own price ceilings (so-called reference pricing; see
Jacobzone 2000).
Figure 2 illustrates how options are constrained and welfare diminished if
countries are limited to a uniform price. With this restriction on pricing, the
available combinations of welfare and revenue are largely limited to those on
the dashed line drawn inside the constrained boundary (in bold).
28 The mono-
poly revenue, Rm, is no longer possible because it requires different prices across
countries.
29
TRIPS
As a result of the TRIPS component of the treaty establishing the WTO,a l lm e m b e r
countries are expected to grant and enforce 20-year patents on pharmaceutical
innovation.Becausemostrichcountriesalreadyoffersuchprotection,themainresult
of TRIPSisto strengthen pharmaceutical patent rightsin agroup of poorercountries.
Point D in figure 3 indicates a possible ‘‘pre-TRIPS’’ location for a pharmaceu-
tical treating a disease with global incidence (for example, cancer). Firms have
patent rights (often with price control) in most countries, with generic competi-
tion in some poor countries. Both regulation and competition push firm net
revenue below Rm, where welfare is also lower than it need be, given R, because
the global prices that result from the current system of uncoordinated national
price regulation and free market pricing are unlikely to correspond to Ramsey
prices for any social welfare function.
30 The introduction of TRIPS results in a
move to one of the points denoted Ei, i=1,2,3. Stronger patent rights increase
the net revenue on drug sales. R grows very little, however, because markets in
27. In practice, costs of intermediation allow for some limited differentiations even when arbitrage is
legal (see Ganslandt and Maskus 2004 for evidence within the European Union). Intermediation becomes
considerably more difficult if transshipments are illegal.
28. In addition, the set of possible (R, W) points will include some single points below the boundary,
because the nonmonotone relationship between profit and price varies across countries.
29. The European Union initiated an enforcement effort to enable firms to differentiate (‘‘tier’’) prices
to the benefit of poor countries without being damaged by illegal arbitrage. It allows firms to register
approved tier-priced drugs and mark them with an identificable logo. Customs authorities are directed to
detain market products as they come into the European Union. See http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/csc/
med08_en.htm (accessed May 26, 2003).
30. See Scherer and Watal (2002) on antiretroviral drugs. Prices may not correspond closely to
income levels because price regulations are less effective in poorer countries or because it can be profit-
able for a firm to target only the upper class in a poor country with a very unequal income distribution.
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Lanjouw (2002) estimates, for example, that countries with half the world’s
population account for less than 2 percent of spending on cardiovascular drugs.
For this reason firms often choose not to obtain patents in poor countries even
when they are able to (Attaran and Gillespie-White 2001).
TRIPS also changes the structure of contributions so that a greater share of total
net revenue comes from sales in poorer countries. Because in some countries prices
are higher with TRIPS but nowhere are prices lower, welfare certainly decreases.
How much welfare has fallen, however, depends on the social welfare function
used. Because relatively poor countries have higher prices as a result of TRIPS,a
welfare function with any aversion to inequality would suggest that welfare falls
steeply, as indicated by point E1 in figure 3. But if there is little concern for
distribution, the welfare fall may be moderate, as indicated by point E2.
Figure 3 illustrates an important question regarding the purpose of TRIPS.I f
the goal is to increase the relative share of global research costs paid by poor
countries to be somehow fair, it seems reasonable to keep net revenue at the pre-
TRIPS level of point D by pairing the new patent regime with stronger price
control in the rich countries (that is, lower prices). Alternatively, if the purpose
is to slightly increase the net revenue received by an innovative firm from a given
product, it seems worthwhile to consider whether strengthening patent rights in
poorer countries is the best option. There are, after all, many alternatives:
Targeting point E3, for example, would move prices in rich countries closer to
Ramsey prices. At the most basic level, this means that countries with similar
income levels and demand patterns should have similar markups.
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FIGURE 3. Revenue-Welfare Implications of TRIPS
Note: The effect of TRIPS is to induce a move from pont D to a point like either E1 or E2, where
welfare is lower and revenue is marginally higher. An alternative would be to move to a point like
E3, which allows the same increase in revenue, but with a positive impact on welfare.
Jack and Lanjouw 63Tradeoffs for a product that is specific to developing economies must also be
considered. Suppose, for simplicity, that a product, such as a vaccine for
malaria, does not yet exist and would have no market outside of developing
areas (point C in figure 1). Clearly, if nonsales revenue sources of research
support are enough to have the product invented (that is, if T is large enough),
there is no reason to allow a profit margin on sales, and optimal prices would
lead to point B. In this situation granting patent rights in developing economics
would be damaging to welfare.
However, it seems unrealistic to assume that this will always be the case.
Indeed, health advocates often stress the enormous gap between the human
suffering caused by developing area–specific diseases and the relatively low level
of public and philanthropic investment to discover products to treat them.
31
That is, point B simply may not be possible; there may need to be some
contribution from consuming countries in the form of net revenue for the
desired innovation to occur. Without any additional incentive society might
remain at point C. Thus, for products specific to the developing world there is
some rationale for having patents in the poorer countries.
32
V. CONCLUSION
Techniques of modern public finance have been employed to consider how
pharmaceutical prices should be set in a global context. In particular, how
concern about the extreme inequality in the distribution of world income
leads to adjustments to standard pricing prescriptions has been considered.
With these adjustments poor countries should not necessarily cover their own
marginal costs of drug production and distribution. In particular, poor countries
should not necessarily share in any of the costs of R&D. Also, the pricing
structure is not related to what would be chosen by a monopolist in a simple
(proportional) way. Both of these results are at odds with standard analyses that
do not take into explicit account distributional concerns.
Care has been used here to distinguish between general tax sources for
financing R&D incentives and sales revenues, although little has been said
about what the split between these two sources should be. It is explicitly
recognized that private R&D cannot be treated as free, and although there
might be ways of limiting the economic rents earned by pharmaceutical com-
panies (for example, through various contractual mechanisms), in the end the
costs of R&D must fall either on taxpayers in general or consumers of the
product.
31. See, for example, the reports of the Me ´decins Sans Frontie `res Working Group on Drugs for
Neglected Diseases at www.accessmed-msf.org/dnd. It is estimated that almost a million children die each
year from malaria.
32. See Lanjouw (2002, 2003) for a mechanism that allows different global patent rights for different
diseases.
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within-country targeting. This is avoided by assuming that all individuals in a
given country are identical, but in practice there is likely to be a concern that
some of the benefits of low drug prices in poor countries might accrue to local
elites. These benefits might accrue to them as consumers, and members of the
elite might also be able to appropriate some of the benefits of lower (import)
prices if they act as intermediaries. Nevertheless it is expected that significant
benefits would often reach the poor, especially if low prices are implemented
through competition and not by regulation.
Finally, the framework has been used to examine ongoing debates on the
international patent system and global pricing. In particular, the very small
net revenue increase that TRIPS might afford pharmaceutical companies
(thereby strengthening R&D incentives) comes at the cost of shifting a
greater share of the burden onto poorer countries. The same increase in
incentives could be implemented in an alternative fashion with a positive
welfare effect.
APPENDIX
Figure A1 shows that in the special case where bi=b optimal prices are such that
the price in each country is at least as high as ci, the marginal production and
distribution cost. It also shows that when the bi’s are not the same across
countries, the price in one country may be lower than ci. Return to the discus-
R
βn
R*
n R*
s
dSCs/dRs
dSCn/dRn
R
βs
R*
n R*
s
dSCs/dRs
dSCn/dRn
βs
βn
Panel A Panel B
FIGURE A1. Marginal Social Costs of Revenue Generation in Countries n and s
Jack and Lanjouw 65sion immediately following equation 5 where the marginal social cost of raising
additional net revenue in country i was the ratio of  (@w)/@vi)( @vi/@pi)t o
yi+(pi ci)( @yi)/@pi. Using equation 3, this ratio is
MSCi=MRi ¼  iyi= yi þ½ pi   ci ½@yi=@pi  ðÞ : ð20Þ
This ratio is the change in social cost from raising an additional dollar in
country i, dSCi/dRi, at a price, pi. At the optimal prices, the marginal social
cost of raising revenue is equalized across countries: dSCs/dRs=l=dSCn/dRn.
Note that when the price in country i is just equal to production cost ci there,
equation 20 collapses to
MSCi=MRi ¼ dSCi=dRi ¼  i: ð21Þ
Two cases are shown in figure A1. In panel A the length of the horizontal axis
represents the total net revenue of R to be raised. The amount raised in country
n is measured from the left and that in country s from the right. The horizontal
dashed line is the marginal cost, which is assumed to be the same across
countries: cn=cs=c. Generating revenue in either country imposes a social
cost. First consider the social cost when revenue is raised in the south. When
ps=c, revenue from the south is zero (the right edge of the figure). Equation 21
shows that the marginal social cost of generating an additional unit of revenue
at this point is bs. The cost increases moving left, and more revenue is generated
in country s through increases in ps. The same applies for the north starting from
the left edge of the figure. This gives the two marginal social cost curves. In
panel A, bn=bs, so the curves cross at some point in the middle of the figure,
meaning that both north and south contribute to the revenue requirement in
amounts R 
n and R 
s, respectively, and prices in each are above marginal cost.
In panel B it assumed that bn<bs. Now the two cost curves can cross at a
point outside the interval shown, meaning that the net revenue requirement, R,
should be shared between the two countries by having country n contribute
R 
n > R, while country s receives a subsidy in the amount of R 
s ¼ R 
n   R,b y
paying less than the marginal cost of production.
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